地方政府间竞争行为的博弈分析

An Analysis of the Game Behavior of Local Governments

从非合作博弈的角度出发,结合后转型时期地方政府间竞争成本逐渐凸显的现实,本文建立市场分割模型、重复建设模型和政治竞争模型,从三个不同的维度分析后转型时期地方政府间的竞争行为及其竞争后果,并探讨使地方政府行为从竞争转向合作的激励机制和制度安排。研究发现:市场分割、重复建设是地方政府过度利用地区经济发展权的后果,政治竞争根源于单一的地方政府绩效评估体制,而适当的制度安排可以在保持地方政府发展经济积极性的同时,约束地方政府间的竞争行为,促进地方政府间的合作,有利于区域经济体系的完善和经济的和谐发展。

Combining with the sticking out of the disadvantage of local governments’ competition, using non-cooperative game theory, we build market segmentation model, duplicative investment model and political competition model to analyze the behaviors and results of the competition between local governments, meanwhile, to analyze the motivate mechanism and institutional arrangements for transferring competition to cooperation. Our analysis indicates that market segmentation and duplication investment are owed to local governments excessively taking advantage of economic development power; Political competitions are owed to the singly government achievement-evaluation system. However, some institutional arrangements can not only keep local governments’ enthusiasm on economic development, but restrain local governments’ competitive behaviors as well as promoting cooperation. All these are beneficial and important for perfecting regional industry system and promoting economy’s harmonious development.