摘要
本文以国家助学贷款政策在执行过程中遭遇困境为切入点,基于相关理论提出了两个研究假设,并进行了探讨和验证。本研究认为,由于地方政府和相关银行这两类政策参与者在落实国家助学贷款政策中自身利益受到减损,以及政策指令对参与者约束力的缺失,导致了国家助学贷款政策在执行中遭遇困境并在部分地方无法得到落实。本研究以"利益损益"和"约束力存失"两个变量构建了分析框架,并结合国家助学贷款政策执行的实际情况进行探讨,试图构建分析分配型政策执行现象的解释性理论。
This paper intends to develop theoretical explanations of some puzzled phenomenon of the implementation process of the national college student loan policy. Based on the policy implementation theories, the paper draws out two presumptions and tests the presumptions through analyzing the collected data. Two major factors that affect the policy implantation process of the policy are discussed in the paper :first , some local governments and relative banks refuse to carry out the policy due to their interest lost; second, the force of policy instructions from the centre government is reduced during the policy process. Based on the founding of the research, the paper develops an analytic framework focus on the two factor “interest benefit/cost” and “sanction persistence/ decline”, and four theory statements are presented which attempt to give explanation to the implementation process of collocate policy in China.
出处
《教育发展研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第3期28-33,共6页
Research in Educational Development
基金
“中国大陆地区教育政策执行的案例分析与理论构建”阶段性成果
关键词
国家助学贷款政策
分配型政策
利益损益
约束力存失
national college students loan, allocation policy, interest benefit/cost, sanction persistence/ decline