论帕菲特的“人格认同”理论

On Parfit's Personal Identity

帕菲特的"人格认同"理论在心灵哲学领域占有重要的地位。但帕菲特所运用的假设事例(大卫.威金斯所处理的一个病例)并不能很好地支持其观点。威金斯病例产生了一个"怪异的假设",即分离的自我的可能性。帕菲特在此所遇到的问题是,当两部分结合在一起时,先前的每个人将如何被保存下来?如果将杰克和吉尔结合为一个人,他们每个人在新的杰克/吉尔同一体中将怎样存在?将两个人结合为一个新的人体是不可能的事情,没有理由相信结合在一起的任何一个人会存在一刹那。人格认同问题是一个十分严肃的问题,不应该进行随意的、简单化的处理。

Parfit＇s theory of personal identity plays an important role in the area of the philosophy of mind. But the Wiggins case that Parfit takes use of in his discussion can not commendably support his own idea. The Wiggins case produces a monstrous hypothesis： the possibility of divided self. In this case, Parfit is confronted with a difficult problem： when the two parts become merged, how can the previous two separated individuals be preserved？ If Jack and Jill are combined into one person, how can they exist in the new identical person Lack/Jill？ It is not possible to make two persons merged into a new physical man, so there is no reason to believe they can exist in this new person for a moment. Personal identity is a serious question which should not be dealt with at will simply.