摘要
在创业投资过程中,创业投资者、创业投资家与创业企业家之间,存在着双重委托代理关系以及由此所引起的逆向选择与道德风险问题。因此,建立起一个具有良好激励约束监督作用的契约机制至关重要,对此进行了较为详细的理论综述与综合评价。
In the process of venture investment, there exist dual principal-agent relations among venture investor, venture capitalist and entrepreneur, which results in problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore the foundation of a contract mechanism with incentive,restrictive and monitor fimctions is important, which is theoretically analyzed and evaluated.
出处
《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2008年第2期114-117,共4页
Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences
关键词
创业投资
委托代理
逆向选择
道德风险
契约机制
venture investment
principal-agent
adverse selection
moral hazard
contract mechanism
