摘要
通过建立两厂商和两子市场的两阶段博弈模型,分析具有网络外部效应的寡头竞争市场厂商实施三度歧视定价的产出、价格和社会福利问题.研究结果表明:厂商通过歧视定价提高了强市场的价格,相应降低了弱市场的价格,虽然总产出没有改变,但却减少了社会总福利.
Based on the game model with two periods in the duopoly and two separate sub-markets setting, the price, output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination with network externality are analyzed. The results show that the price in the strong market is heightened and the price in the weak market is lowered under price discrimination regime. The social welfare is worsen even if total output is unaffected by the regime change.
出处
《控制与决策》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第3期251-257,共7页
Control and Decision
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70602029)
教育部科学技术研究重点项目(105149)
关键词
三度价格歧视
网络外部效应
寡头竞争
Third-degree price discrimination
Network externality
Duopoly
