两大股权激励方式激励作用的比较研究--基于厌恶经理人的委托代理模型分析

A Comparative Research of the Incentive Effect of Two Stock Ownership Encouragement Means——An Analysis of Agency-by-mandate Model Based on Risk Averse Managers

笔者采用委托代理模型,以股东为风险中性、经理人为风险厌恶为基本假设,分析了限制性股票和股票期权两种股权激励形式的激励作用。结果显示,当限制性股票无偿赠送给经理人时,股票期权的激励作用大于股票的激励作用;为激励经理人采取股东希望的行动,股票期权对股东的经济成本低于限制性股票对股东的经济成本。这一结论为我国股权分置改革后上市公司选择股权激励方式提供了一定的理论借鉴。

The author uses agency - by - mandate model, and taking stockholders as risk neutral and managers as risk averse, analyzes the encouragement effect of two means of stock ownership encouragement, restricted stock and stock option. The result shows that when restricted stocks are presented to managers without repay the encouragement effect of stock option is greater than that of stocks; to encourage managers to take the measures that stockholders hope for, the economic cost of stock option for stockholders is lower than that of restricted stocks for stockholders. This conclusion provides some theoretical reference for Chinese listed companies choosing stock ownership encouragement means after the equity division reform of our country.