摘要
在项目管理实践中,业主通常会设立激励机制以确保项目按期完成,而承包商则会根据业主设定的激励机制合理安排项目进度。本文讨论了大型项目的激励机制,研究了业主和承包商的决策问题,建立了以项目收益净现值最大化为目标函数的Stackelberg主从递阶决策模型。通过各子项目激励强度的设定对激励机制进行优化,协调业主和各承包商的利益关系,进而实现业主收益的最大化。
In the practice of the project management, the client usually establishes a incentive mechanism to insure that the project will be completed punctually. This paper discusses the incentive mechanism of large-scale project, and a stackelberg model is builted up according to the decision making of the cliet and the contactors, its target is max-NVP. Then the incentive mechanism is optimized by the model, and the benefits relation between the client and contractors is harmonized.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第1期102-105,共4页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70702013)
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20070421116)
