投资机会(IOS)设定下公司内部治理对经营绩效的影响--基于中国上市公司的经验研究

The Effect of Corporate Internal Governance on Operating Performance under IOS:Based on Empirical Evidences of China's Listed Companies

传统的公司治理研究将处于不同组织环境的企业等同对待,造成了研究结论的较大分歧。本文依据投资机会集(IOS)理论,运用我国上市公司的经验证据,在设定投资机会集的条件下,考察了不同成长性的企业其公司治理对经营绩效的影响。研究结果表明:成长性较高的公司,其经营绩效的改善与独立董事比例、高管层的持股比例显著正相关,但与高管层年薪相关关系不显著;成长性较低的公司,其经营绩效的提高与独立董事比例和高管层的持股比例相关关系均不显著,但与高管层年薪存在弱的正相关关系。

In the traditional corporate governance investigation,companies in different organizational environment were studied equally,so previous research has been mixed.Based on IOS theory,we examine the effect of corporate internal governance on operating performance under investment opportunity set.Using a sample of growth and non-growth firms in Chinese market,we find： firstly,as for growth firms,the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and proportion of independent directors on the board is positive and significant;the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and increasing shares of top-management is positive and significant;the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and top-management remuneration insignificant.Secondly,as for nongrowth firms,the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and proportion of independent directors on the board is insignificant;the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and increasing shares of top-management is insignificant;the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and topmanagement remuneration is weakly positive and significant.