期刊文献+

审计委员会治理:防范校企合作创新中逆向选择风险的作用 被引量:4

Governance of Audit Committee: To Control Adverse Selection Risk of Collaborative Technology Innovation between Firms and Colleges
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摘要 本文运用博弈论基本原理和模型,描述了校企合作创新中技术交易行为的整个博弈均衡过程,指明和阐释了逆向选择现象的形成机理,进而探讨如何发挥审计委员会等的监督和治理作用,以降低和防范逆向选择行为的发生。 This paper uses game theory and model to analyze the whole game equilibrium process in the technology transaction in the collaborative technology innovation between firms and colleges.It also analyzes the causality of adverse selection,and discusses how to prevent it by the governance of audit committee.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 2008年第1期137-139,共3页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(7017201070671058) 全国教育科学十五规划资助项目(FFB011159)
关键词 校企合作技术创新 博弈分析 逆向选择 防范 collaborative technology innovation between firms and colleges game analysis adverse selection prevention
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参考文献4

  • 1Noteboom, B. Innovation and inter finn linkages: new implications for policy [ J ]. Research Policy, 1999, 28 (8) : 793 - 805.
  • 2Markman, G. D., Gianiodis, P. T., Phan, P. H., Balkin, D. B Innovation speed: transferring university technology to market [ J ] Research Policy, 2005,34 (7) : 1058 - 1075.
  • 3Ramani S.V. Technology cooperation between firms of developed and less developed countries [ J ]. Economics Letters, 2000,68 : 203 - 209.
  • 4Carlier, G. A general existence result for the principal - agent problem with adverse selection [ J ]. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2001, 35( 1 ) : 129 - 150.

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