对克里普克先验偶然命题的辩护

Defending Kripke's Priori and Contingent Propositions

在《命名与必然性》中,克里普克论证了"一米等于S在时间t0时的长度"是一个先验的偶然命题。因为,这是一个确定"一米"指称的定义,因而是一个先验命题;克里普克还从两个方面论证了"一米等于S在时间t0时的长度"是一个偶然命题,其一是这只是通过确定指称给出一个定义,所以该命题不是必然的;其二是通过指出"一米"是严格指示词,而"S在时间t0时的长度"是非严格指示词,所以该命题是偶然命题。

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that ＂S is one meter long at t0＂ is a priori, contingent proposition. ＂S is one meter long at t0＂ is a definition to fix the reference of one meter, so it should be a priori proposition. Kripke also demonstrates that ＂S is one meter long at t0＂ is a contingent proposition from two aspects. On the one hand, this statement only gives a definition by fixing reference, which means the proposition is not a necessity~ and on the other hand, ＂one meter＂ is a rigid designator, but＂The length of S at t0＂ does not designate anything rigid.