摘要
通过构建我国中央与地方林业投资的博弈模型,深入分析了两类利益主体所处的数种纳什均衡,借以探讨了在“天然林保护工程”实施中地方林业配套资金难以落实的问题,并查找原因,提出建议。
Setting up the game theory model of forestry investment between the central and the local, the paper deeply analyzes two kinds of interesters in some Nash-equilibrium. Using these theories, it discusses the problem of local quota financing which always is difficult to fulfill in the Nature Forest Protection Project, and find some reasons, put forward some advices.
出处
《林业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第3期48-50,共3页
Forestry Economics
基金
黑龙江省博士后经费资助项目(编号:LRB05—017)
关键词
林业
投资
利益
博弈
forestry
investment
interest
game