大股东控制下的关联投资：“效率促进”抑或“转移资源”

The Interested-party Investment Controlled by Controlling Shareholders: Enhancing Efficiency or Transferring Resources

在我国资本市场上,上市公司与其控股股东之间的关联投资是一种常见的投资现象,也是一种重要的关联交易形式。本文从"效率促进"和"转移资源"的视角对我国大股东控制下的上市公司关联投资进行分析。以2002￣2004年的样本数据为依据,研究结果表明:上市公司的关联投资与企业绩效呈现负相关关系,关联投资并未增加企业价值,而是成为控股股东转移上市公司资源的一种渠道。进一步,当上市公司前一年发实施了IPO或SEO,EBIT较高时,关联投资与企业绩效呈现负相关关系;而当上市公司ROE为负或3年平均ROE在6%￣8%之间时,关联投资与企业绩效显著正相关,说明控股股东会根据上市公司可供转移的资源多寡,通过关联投资将资源转出或转入上市公司,以实现控制权私利的最大化。

In China's capital market, the interested-party investment of controlling shareholders of listed companies in listed companies controlled by them, is not only a frequent occurrence in investment, but also an important form of interested-party transactions. Starting from the angle of 'enhancing efficiency' and 'transferring resources', and based on the data on the specimens of 2002 to2004, we have dissected the above-mentioned investment. Our fingdings indicate that there is a negative relationship between the said interested-party investment and listed companies' performance, that this investment has not added value to companies, and that this investment has become an approach to controlling shareholders transferring listed companies' resources. Specifically, when a company's BEIT is high, the investment mentioned above is negatively correlated to the performance of companies that conducted IPO or SEO in the pervious year; when a company's POE is negative or its average ROE for the past three years range from 6% to 8%, the said investment, however, is significantly correlated to company's performance; the two facts mentioned above show that, according to the amount of manageable resources, the controlling shareholders will transfer resources into or out of companies through interested-party investment to maximize their selfish interests.