摘要
企业家激励约束机制源于现代公司制企业所有权与控制权的分离。对应于两权分离,经营者与所有者之间行为目标的不一致导致委托代理的产生。中国国有企业改革步履艰难的一个重要原因,就是缺乏对企业高层经理人员的有效激励和约束,建立企业家激励约束机制对称安排已成为国有企业改革的一项紧迫任务。
The enterpriser incentive- restriction mechanism originated from the separation of ownership and control. For separation of ownership and control, the different targets between managers and owners induce the production of entrusts and agent. An important reason of Chinese state-owned enterprises reform toughing sledding is lack of an effective incentive-restriction mechanism for the executives. How to Build up symmetrical arrangement of enterpriser incentive-restriction mechanism has become an urgent mission of state-owned enterprises reforms.
出处
《河南科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
2008年第1期83-86,共4页
Journal of Henan University of Science & Technology(Social science)
基金
安徽省自然科学基金项目(070416248)阶段性研究成果
关键词
企业家
激励
约束
enterpriser
incentive
restrictive