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基于内生信息的初始排污权拍卖机制研究 被引量:1

Study on the Auction of Initial Emission Tradable Permits Based on the Endogenous Information Structure
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摘要 该研究放松了信息外生给定的假设,认为信息可以内生获取。基于Compte模型构建了不同区域排污权初始分配的动态拍卖模型,模型结果显示,动态拍卖机制比静态拍卖机制更能促使排污企业搜集信息,并使政府部门获取更多收益。 In this paper the assumption of exogenous information structure was expended and it was supposed that the information could be acquired endogenously.Based on the Compte model,the dynamic model describing the allocation of initial emission tradable permits in different region was built.The results showed that the dynamic auction induced more incentives on firms' information acquisition than static auction mechanism,and produced more benefit to the government.
作者 颜伟 唐德善
机构地区 河海大学商学院
出处 《安徽农业科学》 CAS 北大核心 2008年第6期2544-2544,2577,共2页 Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences
关键词 排污权 拍卖 内生信息 Emission tradable permits Auction Endogenous information
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参考文献11

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共引文献100

同被引文献9

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