摘要
本文运用信贷配给理论,建立新的分析框架,从单个银行的信贷配给过程入手,研究信息不对称条件下商业银行的信贷配给行为,寻找国家助学贷款银行惜贷的内在原因,提出破解惜贷的两条路径:一是以小银行为主体开展有担保的国家助学贷款业务;二是以高校为单位"打包"贷款,增大单笔额度,由大银行开展国家助学贷款业务。
Based on credit rationing theory, this paper sets up a new analysis frame. Starting from a single bank＇s credit rationing process, it studies commercial banks＇ credit behavior under the asymmetric information condition and finds the underlying reasons of banks＇ unwilling credit. It provides two ways to solve the problem. One is secured national student loan hosted by small-sized banks, the other is ＂packaged loans＂ mainly to university which is hosted by big banks.
出处
《金融理论与实践》
北大核心
2008年第3期70-73,共4页
Financial Theory and Practice
关键词
国家助学贷款
银行惜贷
担保
信用度
贷款额度
national student loan
banks＇ credit unwillingness
security
credit
loans
