摘要
目前,中国政府已成功地吸引了大量的FDI,但这只是数量上的成功。越来越多的学者对中国FDI的实证研究表明,庞大的FDI在华并未形成显著的技术溢出效应。从政治经济学的角度分析中国地方政府的政治经济地位及其所决定的行为对FDI在华技术溢出效应的影响,中央政府与地方政府之间实质上就是委托-代理的关系。受自身政治经济利益的驱动,地方政府作为引进FDI的直接参与者甚至决策者,是造成FDI在华的技术溢出效应不显著的重要因素之一。
By now China has already attracted substantial FDI. But more and more empirical studies show that such a tremendous quantity hasn't generated significant technology spillovers, which is inconsistent with what the FDI theory suggests. In other words, the good of "exchange of technology with market" which China's central government has taken great pains to fulfill is not well achieved. This paper attempts to address the effect of the political and economic relations and the behaviors of governments in China on FDI technology spillovers. The conclusions are: (1) the central-local relation in China is principal-agent in nature; (2)as involvers and policymakers, the local governments whose behaviors are much likely driven by their political and economic interests, are critical factors that significantly affect FDI technology spillovers.
出处
《华中科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2008年第1期69-73,104,共6页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)