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发电公司与供电公司联合实施可中断负荷的优化模型 被引量:2

Study on the Optimal Model of Interruptible Loads Implemented by Power Generation and Supply Company
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摘要 运用双方叫价拍卖机制,结合纳什讨价还价理论设计可中断负荷的利益分享机制,发电公司和供电公司之间就实施可中断负荷的单位收益和成本进行一对一的报价,自定分享价格。对不完全信息下发电公司和供电公司的报价策略进行了研究,通过求解贝叶斯纳什均衡得出发电公司和供电公司的最优报价策略。 The mechanism of double auction combined with Nash Bargaining were used to design the benefit sharing mechanism between the generation company and the power supply company, in which both the two side bid their gain and cost of the IL respectively and made the sharing price themselves. At the same time, the bidding strategies of them were also studied, and the optimal strategies were obtained by the calculation of Nash-Bayesian equilibrium.
出处 《电力科学与工程》 2008年第2期16-19,共4页 Electric Power Science and Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(7037301770571023) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助(NCET-06-02-08)
关键词 可中断负荷 纳什讨价还价 双方叫价拍卖 线性报价 单一报价 Interruptible Loads (IL) Nash Bargaining double auction linear bidding single bidding
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参考文献7

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