期刊文献+

基于委托-代理理论的团队运作条件模型分析 被引量:8

Analysis of Team Operation Condition Using Principal-Agent Theory
下载PDF
导出
摘要 分析了团队工作的协同效应与"搭便车"效应。建立了员工独立工作与团队工作的委托-代理模型。通过对比不同工作方式下委托人的收益,得出结论:团队合作是否优于个人单独工作取决于合作的协同系数、外生随机变量的方差、成员的风险规避度及努力成本系数;只有工作性质与人员特征相互匹配,使得4种因素满足一定条件时,团队运作才是有利的,否则独立工作是最佳选择。 Synergistic effect and “free-rider” effect in teamwork were analyzed. The principal-a- gent models for employee's independent work and teamwork were established. It is concluded by comparing the principal's benefits from the different working that whether or not teamwork is superior to individual work lies on synergistic coefficient, variance of exogenous random variable, the team number's risk-averse parameter and the cost coefficient of effort. When work properties assort with personnel character, accordingly the four factors satisfies definite conditions, it is beneficial to form personnel into a team; otherwise it is the optimal choice to let them work independently.
出处 《管理学报》 CSSCI 2008年第2期218-221,共4页 Chinese Journal of Management
关键词 团队 协同效应 “搭便车” 风险规避 team synergistic effect free-rider ~ risk-averse
  • 相关文献

参考文献15

  • 1[1]STEPHEN P R,MARY C.Management[M].New Jersey:Prentice Hall Inc,1994:269~283.
  • 2[2]STEPHEN P R.Organizational Bahavior[M].New Jersey:Prentice Hall Inc,1996:267~285.
  • 3黄大成,吴强,李传峰.团队生产存在的缘由探究——一种人力资本的观点[J].科学学研究,2005,23(B12):225-229. 被引量:2
  • 4[4]ALCHIAN A,DEMSETZ H.Production,Information Costs and Economic Organization[J].American Economic Review,1972,62(5):777~795.
  • 5[5]HOLMSTROM B.Moral Hazard in Team[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13(2):324~340.
  • 6[6]KANDEL E,LAZEAR E P.Peer Pressure and Partnerships[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(4):801~817.
  • 7[7]MCAFEE R,MCMILLAN J.Optimal contracts for teams[J].International Economic Reviews,1991,32(3):561~577.
  • 8[8]RASMUSEN E.Moral Hazard inRisk Averse Teams[J].Rand journal of Economics,1987,18(3):428~435.
  • 9[9]ITOH H.Incentive for Help in Multi-agency Situation[J].Economitrica,1991(59):611~636.
  • 10王重鸣,邓靖松.团队中信任形成的映象决策机制[J].心理学报,2007,39(2):321-327. 被引量:14

二级参考文献49

  • 1张朝孝,蒲勇健.团队合作与激励结构的关系及博弈模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2004,18(4):12-16. 被引量:30
  • 2田盈,蒲勇健.团队协作激励机制博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(2):133-135. 被引量:21
  • 3陈清泰 吴敬琏.《股票期权实证研究》[M].中国财政经济出版社,2001..
  • 4陈郁.《所有权、控制权与激励:代理经济学文选》[M].上海三联书店,1997年..
  • 5G.Baker(1992), "Incentive contracts and performance measurement", JPE100
  • 6G.Baker(2000), "The use of performance measures in incentive contracting", AER 90(2)
  • 7Berliner(1976), The Innovation Decision In Soviet Industry, MIT Press.
  • 8D.Bulow & J.Geanakoplos(1985), "Multi- market oligopoly:Strategic substitutes and complements", JPE 93
  • 9H.Demsetz( 1983), "The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm", J Law & Economics 26
  • 10Dixit(1997), "Power of incentive in private versus public organization", AER 87(2)

共引文献104

同被引文献126

引证文献8

二级引证文献68

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部