税收非对称性与银行风险监管关系研究

The Asymmetry of Tax and Bank Risks Supervision:A New Analytical View of Its Relationship

通过将银行收入税的非对称性引入模型,分析银行在存在风险的情况下如何确定最优贷款期限以及收入税将如何影响银行决策者的决策过程,然后采用一个动态博弈的框架来讨论最优的银行监管政策。结果表明,非对称性的收入税对银行的贷款风险大小产生影响,它使得银行开始关心并减少风险,为银行业的监管和减少不良贷款提供了一个思路。

This paper first introduces the asymmetry of tax into the model and analyzes how banks ascertain optimum time limit of loans, and how income tax influences decision-making process for banking decision-makers, then establishes a theoretical frame to discuss optimum strategy of bank supervision. The results suggest that the asymmetry income tax affects the risk of loan and decision-makers should be alert to such potential risks, and finally the author provides an approach to supervise and reduce the non-performing loans for decision-makers.