控制能力、代理成本与独立审计的公司治理效应--中国民营上市公司的经验证据

Corporate governance effects of control capacity,agency cost,and independent audit —Emprical evidence from Chinese private listing corporations

以近几年中国民营上市公司为样本,实证分析实际控制人控制能力、代理成本、会计师事务所选择及其治理效应,可以发现实际控制人控制能力越强的公司越倾向于选择曾经被监管机构赋予专项复核资格的会计师事务所。通过两阶段回归发现,市场对聘请此类会计师事务所作出了正面评价,而且此类会计师事务所对大股东占用上市公司资金具有监督和抑制作用。

This article takes Chinese private listing corporations in recent years as the sample, makes empirical analysis on the control capacity of the de facto controller, agency cost, the selection of accounting firms, and the governance effects, and finds that the corporations with more powerful de facto controllers tend to select the accounting firms with special item review qualification authorized by the supervisors. Through two- stage regression, the market makes positive comments on their selection. These special accounting firms play a supervision and restraint role in the resource expropriation by large shareholders.