新区土地改革中的地方政府行为分析

Local government behavior analysis in new district land reform

1950年冬到1952年底的新区土地改革中,面对中央政府显著强势和极其有限的授权,地方政府作为农地产权制度变迁的"次级行动集团",在中央宏观政策、地方法规和干部素质以及农村社会现状的约束下,运用政治、行政、法律和宣传等多重行为手段,追求政治和经济利益最大化。地方政府在农地产权制度变迁中连接中央和农民的中枢地位与执行中的微观配置角色,使其成为实现这一制度变迁的重要力量和农地制度领域研究中不可忽视的主体。

In land reform in the newly liberated areas, acting as ＂secondary action organization＂ and with extremely limited authorization, local governments take certain measures to game with central government and local people on behalf of local people and itself. Under restrictions from central government, rural areas and itself, local governments succeed in changing the land tenure from landlord land private system to farmer land private system by carrying out central government＇s policies, which make itself important and indispensable in land tenure changing.