控制权与激励的冲突--兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析

The Conflicts between Control Rights and Incentives:An Empirical Analysis on the Effect of Stock Incentives in China

控制权配置与激励安排是组织治理中的两个重要工具,本文首先从组织中委托人私人收益角度分析委托人控制权与代理人激励之间可能的冲突,进而通过上市公司数据对这一冲突关系进行经验检验。我们的研究发现,中国上市公司大股东控制权与管理层股权激励之间存在显著的冲突,而且这种冲突与股权性质、公司成长速度相关。民营控股公司中的冲突程度显著弱于其他类型公司,国资委控股公司中的冲突显著强于其他类型公司;而公司成长速度越快,大股东控制权与管理层激励之间的冲突越强。本文的研究结果能够很好地解释中国上市国有企业中股权激励效果不显著、甚至出现负效应的经验现象,并由此提出相应的政策建议。

The allocation of control rights and the provision of incentives are two fundamentals in corporate governance. This paper analyzes the conflicts between control rights and incentives resulted from private interests of principals, and tests the hypothesis with data from Chinese listed companies. We find that the coefficient of the interaction between the control rights of large shareholders and the manager＇s incentives is significantly negative, and the degree of such conflicts depends on the property ownership and the growth rate of companies. The degree of conflicts is significantly lower in private owned companies, while significantly higher in companies owned by the Committee of State Asset Management, and will increase with the growth of companies. These results can explain the zero （or negative） effects of stock incentives on corporate performance in Chinese SOEs, and argue the previous findings which take ownership structure as necessary for the effectiveness of stock incentives.