审计师选择与设立审计委员会的自选择问题——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

Auditor Selection and Self-Selection of Audit Committee Formation:Empirical Evidence from China's Security Market

本文采用Heckman(1978)的二阶段回归方法,以2002-2006年我国证券市场上市公司为研究样本,在研究审计师选择的同时控制了设立审计委员会的自选择问题,并将公司设立审计委员会的实际情况与假设的相反情况进行对比,分析它们不同的审计师选择倾向,从而间接检验了审计委员会的治理效率。研究发现:自选择问题对审计师选择存在显著的影响。因此,拒绝了公司随机设立审计委员会的原假设;在控制自选择之后,回归方程中变量的斜率系数整体上存在显著差异;并且没有设立审计委员会的公司比设立审计委员会的公司更可能聘请"四大"会计师事务所。

Using two-stage procedure of Heckman （1978）, this paper takes listed companies from 2002 to 2006 as samples. We control the self-selection of audit committee while studying auditor selection and compare the actual condition with the opposite condition of audit committee formation to test the efficiency of audit committee indirectly. We find that the self-selection bias impacts on auditor selection significantly, so we reject the null hypothesis that audit committees are randomly formatted. After controlling the self-selection bias, the slope coefficients for most of variables differ significantly between the groups. The companies whose audit committees are formatted engage the Big4 more probably than the companies whose audit committees aren＇t formatted.