单一供给来源环境下的国防采办激励契约设计

Design on the Incentive Contract of Defense Procurement in Sole-Sourcing Surroundings

单一供给来源环境下的国防采办一般由政府和唯一的供应商通过签订双边契约的方式进行。在风险分享、私有信息、道德危机和不完全成本监督等问题同时存在的情况下,对委托—代理模型的研究表明,契约应采用成本加激励费形式,即最优成本补偿比例应严格大于0小于1;最好解与次好解的相对大小取决于道德危机和私人信息问题的相对严重性。

Defense procurement in sole -sourcing surroundings is generally enforced on bilateral contract by the government and the only supplier. Principal -agent model in the presence of risk sharing, private information, moral hazard and imperfect monitoring indicate that Cost Plus Incentive Fee Contract should be used, namely, the optimal cost reimbursement proportion should be strictly positive and less than one.