“大清洗”盈余操作的行为动机研究--来自我国大亏公司的经验证据被引量：2

Behavior and Motivation Research on the Big Bath Companies' Earning Management——Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

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摘要研究我国大亏公司的"大清洗"盈余操作行为,可以从更深层次上揭示我国企业盈余操作的动机和给投资者带来的风险与利益损害,由此可以更好地理解和执行我国的新会计准则,保护投资者利益。对大亏公司"大清洗"行为动机、实现手段和对投资者利益影响的研究结论,可以为我国新准则规定的"不允许资产减值准备冲回"提供合理的实证和解释依据。 By studying on the behavior and motivation of the listed companies under heavy deficit of earning management, the authors can discover the proper time of earning management and the risk for the investors, which can help us better understand the new accounting rules and protect the investors. Through studying on the behavior and motivation of the listed companies under heavy deficit of earning management, the results offer reasonable explanations for the new accounting rule

作者唐清泉夏芸张迪

机构地区中山大学管理学院暨南大学珠海学院

出处《山西财经大学学报》 CSSCI 2008年第3期113-119,共7页 Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(70272921) 中山大学“985工程”创新基地资助项目

关键词大亏公司大清洗盈余操作投资者保护 listed companies under heavy deficit Big Bath earning management investor protection

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

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