1Arrow K J. Handbook of mathematical economics [M]. edited by Arrow and M. D. Intrilligator, North-Holland.1986: 1183～ 1200.
2Bamberg G, Spremann K. Implications of constant risk aversion [J]. Operations Research, 1981 (25): 205～224.
3Christopher M S. Negotiation and renegotiations offinance Contracts under the threat of predation [J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, sept, 1996:325 ～ 343.
4Garen I E. Executive compensation and principal-ageut theory [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1994 (102):1175 ～ 1199.
5Greenwald B C, Joseph E S. Asymmetric information and the new theory of the firm: Financial constraints and risk behavior [J]. American Economic Review. 1990 (80): 160～ 165.
6Ian Molho. Economics of information [M]. Blackewll Publishers, USA., 1997:1 ～ 12.
7Rick A, John F. Information Rents and Preferences Among Information Systems In a Model of Resource Allocation [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1995 (33): 41～ 58.
8Singh N. Monitoring and hierarchies: The rnarginal value of information in a principal-agent model [J]. Journal of political economy. 1985 (3): 599～609.
