“大而不倒”救助政策的理论和实证研究

Theory and Empirical Study on the Bailout Policy of"Too Big To Fail"

由于大银行倒闭的巨大破坏性,最后贷款人在救助中通常奉行"大而不倒"政策。考虑到救助成本是银行资产规模的增函数,如果救助银行是最优的,那么救助任何一个更大的银行将也是最优的,这也意味着"大而不倒"救助政策在理论上的成立。在"大而不倒"政策下,规模和风险之间存在相互影响的关系。"大而不倒"救助政策影响银行的规模选择和资产风险的组合选择,导致银行追求变得更大且更具风险。

Owing to the devastating effect of the bankruptcy of big banks, the lender of last resort pursues the principle of ＂too big to fail＂ （TBTF） in the bailouts. Given that the bailout cost is an increasing function of the bank＇ s assets, if it is optimal to rescue a bank, then it would be optimal to rescue any larger banks. It means that the bailout policy of ＂TBTF＂ holds water in theory. Under the bailout policy of ＂TBTF＂ , the size of a bank and its risks interact. The bailout policy of ＂TBTF＂ has an impact on a bank＇ s choice of its size and portfolio selection and may lead the bank to become larger and more risky.