摘要
构建了基于第三方回收模式的闭环供应链定价模型,运用博弈理论分析该系统最优定价策略。研究表明:制造商与零售商、制造商与第三方回收商分别构成了Stackelberg博弈关系,制造商只有在决策时必须分别考虑零售商、第三方回收商对自己决策的反应,才能实现自身利益最大化,反之,零售商、第三方回收商也要考虑制造商的决策才能实现自身利益的最大化。此外,该文还分析了模型结构对利润的影响。这些结果证实了闭环供应链的理论基础。
The closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) pricing model is constructed based on the third-party take-back model. This system is most superior fixed price strategy through gambling theory analysis.The research indicates that manufacturers and retailers, manufacturers and the third party take-back business constitute the Stackelberg gambling relations, separately. Manufacturers can realize their own benefit maximization only when they consider separately retailers and the third party take-back business response to their decision-making. Otherwise, retailers and the third party take-back business also need to consider manufacturer' s decision-making, and they can realize their own benefit maximization. In addition, this paper also analyzes the model structure for affecting the profit. Results consummate the rationale of CLSC.
出处
《南京航空航天大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第2期275-278,共4页
Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics
基金
江苏省研究生科技创新基金(XM06-142)资助项目
关键词
供应链
博弈论
制造商
定价策略
supply chains
game theory
manufacturer
pricing decision