论科学规范结构的重构——对默顿规范质疑的思考

Reconsidering the Normative Structure of Science:A Thinking on the Questioning of Merton's Norms

默顿的规范理论是很著名的,但由于囿于纯科学,默顿的概括并不是今天科学家所实际遵守的行为准则的真实写照。本文认为,科学的规范结构需要重构,关键是要充实"诚实性"这一核心规范,并区分出两类规范:第一类规范("诚实性"和"普遍主义")是从一旦触犯便会激起科学家一致的道德义愤而推断出来的,它们具有底线的特质和普适的禁止性功能;第二类规范("无私利性"、"公有性"和"有条理的怀疑主义")是从无数受到推崇的关于科学精神的论述中推断出来的,它们的特质在于普适的倡导性功能及在特殊情况下的禁止性功能,在倡导和禁止之间有一个允许的中间地带。由此,既可以化解对科学规范是否存在的质疑,也可以阐明大科学时代科学的精神气质究竟是什么。

Merton＇s norms is well-known, however it does not reflect every aspect of the common practices that scientists should follow today, given that it is restricted to only pure science. This article reconsiders the normative structure of science. Our key idea is to extend the definition of ＂honesty＂. We make the distinction between two types of norms： the first type （＂honesty＂ and ＂universalism＇） serves as the bottom lines and is universally prohibitive. Its violation will raise the anger of all scientists; the second type （＂disinterestedness＂, ＂collectiveness＂ and ＂organized skepticism＂） stems from numerous well respected arguments related to the spirits of science. It has the characteristic of universal advocacy and prohibition under particular cases. There is a permissible zone between advocacy and prohibition. Therefore, this article not only resolves the question on the existence of science norms but also corroborates the essence of science in the era of grand science.