低价揽客与压价竞争:对审计独立性的影响与管制对策

How Low-bailing and Price-cutting Affect Auditor Independence and How to Regulate Them

低价揽客行为与压价竞争行为问题研究的焦点主要集中在其对审计独立性的影响上,但国外研究没有得出一致且明确的结论,国内研究则更显落后。低价揽客行为与压价竞争对审计独立性影响不确定的基源,在于对两种行为本身的界定的不清晰。低价揽客行为与压价竞争行为的发生,在审计市场竞争环境下具有必然性,并且它们具有共同的本质,即都是事务所让渡部分利益而取得业务的行为。基于此,我们认为,对于压价竞争行为,监管者应该加以管制,但必须划定监管责任,以免陷入监管误区。

Research on low-bailing and price competition is focused on how auditor independence. However, research abroad has not drawn a widely agreed they affect and clear conclusion, and research in China is still farther from doing this. The reason why it is not clear how low-bailing and price competition affect auditor independence is that they are not clearly defined. Low-bailing and price competition are inevitable in the competition environment in the auditing market and they share the same nature, namely, agencies give up some interest in return for business. On the basis of this we maintain that regulators should control price competition and define their responsibilities in order not to exercise regulation in areas beyond their jurisdiction.