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货币政策委员会成员教育、职业背景与通货膨胀关系--国际比较与经验分析 被引量:1

The Relationships Between Inflation and the Educational and Occupational Background of Monetary Policy Commission Members
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摘要 通过考察中国货币政策委员会成员教育、职业背景与通货膨胀的关系,发现有工科、法学和经济学等教育背景的委员与通货膨胀率显著正相关,中央部委背景的委员与通货膨胀率显著负相关。国际比较研究发现,中国货币政策委员会成员教育、职业背景与西方低通货膨胀率国家及西方大国在结构上存在很强的相似性,但是经济学者背景和企业背景的委员比例较小。 This paper analyses the relationships between inflation and educational and occupational background of the monetary policy commission members and gets the conclusion that there exists strong positive relations between the inflation rate and the members with law, economic, engineering background, but exists negative relations between civil servant and the inflation rate. International comparison shows the same relationships between educational and occupational background and inflation in structure, but the members with economic and businessman background in foreign countries take up little percentage. Recently, members with civil servant background increase greatly in China.
出处 《财贸研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第2期85-92,共8页 Finance and Trade Research
关键词 货币政策委员会 成员 教育背景 职业背景 通货膨胀 货币政策 monetary policy commission member education background occupation background inflation monetary policy
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参考文献18

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