非业绩指标存在性的理论分析和实证检验

Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test of the Existence of Non-performance Indexes

从Holmstrom的标准委托—代理模型出发,可以得出高管人员报酬仅仅是业绩的函数,非业绩指标在契约中的存在只会增加代理成本;而从经理主义的经理人自利角度出发,可以对非业绩指标存在性给予充分解释。但在现实中,几乎所有国家上市公司的高管报酬契约中都存在非业绩指标,很难用这些公司股东都没有发现或者没有能力遏制经理的自利行为来进行解释。从理论和实证的角度,对非业绩指标在契约中的存在性进行探讨,阐述规模指标的存在,同样也是符合代理理论和股东利益的。

There is no evidence of the existence of non-performance indexes in the reward contract from the Holmstrom＇ standard Principal-Agent model. But the existence of the non-performance index, especially the size index in the reward contract, can obviously be explained by managerialism. In fact, American, English, Canadian, Japanese and China＇s positive researches have discovered that the size index exists in the reward contract. This phenomenon can hardly be explained by the undiscoveredness and disability of company shareholders to control manager~ self-interest behavior.