摘要
针对现有技术联盟激励机制"刚性"激励的缺陷,提出了技术联盟动态激励思想,通过构建数学模型,分析了动态激励合约对技术供给方的激励作用,得出的基本结论是:动态激励合约的激励强度优于"刚性"激励强度。
Based on game theory and information economics, this artice analyzes the limitation of the rigidity stimulation mecha- nism in traditional contracts, ahich restrains work power of technology suppliers. Then it puts forward idea of dynamic stimulation, constructs the mathematics model, and analyses that the dynamic stimulation contracts＇ incentive effect for technology suppliers. The conclusion is that dynamic stimulation is better than rigidity stimulation.
出处
《山西大同大学学报（自然科学版）》
2008年第1期44-47,共4页
Journal of Shanxi Datong University(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金面上资助项目[70472038]
关键词
技术联盟
动态激励
信誉机制
数学模型
technology-alliance
dynamic stimulation
reputation mechanism
mathematics model
