对农村信用社高管人员激励与监管的博弈分析

The Game Theory Analysis on Regulation to Rural Credit Cooperation Senior Managers

农村信用社资产所有者与其高级管理人员之间关于规避道德风险(隐藏行动)的博弈,实质是高级管理人员激励机制的设计。激励机制要求农村信用社向高级管理人员让渡一部分利润。金融监管机构与农村信用社高级管理人员之间在监管行为上存在静态的非重复博弈,最优的监管概率和违规概率是一种混合策略纳什均衡。只有同时通过激励机制和监管机制,才能有效规避农村信用社高级管理人员的道德风险和违规行为。

There exests a game between the RCC assets owner and its senior managers about moral risk avoidance. The Essence of the game theory model is to design an incentive mechanism for senior managers, which needs the RCC assets owner partially share profits with senior managers. The game between finance regulation institutions and RCC senior managers is a static non-- repeat game. The optimal regulation probability and violation probability is a kinds of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The only way to aviod the moral risk and violation behaviour of RCC senior managers is to use incentive mechanism and regulaton mechanism together.