面向一次性合作的供应链协调与激励机制

Coordinative and Incentive Mechanisms of One-Shot Cooperation in Supply Chain

分析了供应链合作协调模式.假设已知影响合作双方收益分配因素,对供应链仅存在一个时期(即一次性)合作的均衡问题,用委托-代理机制建立了合作模型.分析表明,与采取合作策略相比,采取不合作策略时各成员努力水平及供应链的总体净收益较小;供应链中成员的分配系数与其贡献系数成正比,与其创新性活动成本系数和机会成本系数成反比;供应链成员分享的利益随其资源使用效率提高而提高;与非供应链中企业合作的可能性越高,供应链中成员在供应链中分得的利益比例越大.

The coordination in a supply chain was analyzed. A cooperation model for the balance ot one-shot cooperation was derived following the principal-agents mechanism with the factors influencing profit distribution being known. The results of analyses show that the effort level and the total net profit are lower when a noncooperative strategy is adopted than when a cooperative strategy is adopted; the distribution coefficient of a member in the supply chain is proportional to its contributive coefficient, but is inversely proportional to its innovation cost and opportunity cost coefficients ; a member gets more profit as it utilizes resources efficiently, and gets a larger proportion of total profit if the possibility of its cooperation with the non-supply chain members is high.