摘要
"城中村"是中国城市化进程中的一个特殊现象,其存在严重影响了我国城市化进程。"城中村"改造涉及多方利益冲突与协调,本文通过建立不完全信息下动态博弈模型,分析各参与人的最佳策略选择与均衡结果。文章总结出多种城中村改造资金筹措模式,以供城中村实际操作参考之用。
The villages in cities are particular phenomena during the urbanization in China, whose existence greatly affect our country's urbanization progress. The reconstructions involve the conflictions of interests and need coordination. This paper based on an incomplete information dynamic game model, through which we analysis which are the stakeholders' best strategic choices and the balanced results. All of these financing modes can be used as reference in actual operations.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期91-96,共6页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
城中村
博弈模型
融资模式
Villages in cities Game model Financing mode