增发新股博弈中承销商的交易操纵行为

Underwriter's traded-based manipulation: An SEO game

从国内发行核准制度和无市商的电子交易机制出发,借鉴知情交易操纵行为研究方法,探讨了承销增发新股中承销商与非知情策略交易之间信息识别与信息隐藏的博弈过程,考察了承销商在流通市场的操纵交易行为.得到了博弈均衡的充要条件,结果表明承销收入是博弈均衡的关键因素,增大承销收入系数,承销商倾向操纵交易,这将导致市场净指令的信息失效.控制承销收入可有效确保市场效率.

A traded-based manipulation throws the market into disorder and diseases its information efficiency. This paper has discussed a game of information identification and hiding between underwriters and strategy traders under the equity offering approval system and the domestic E-traded mechanism without market maker for inspection of the underwriters＇ manipulation in the secondary market. We get necessary and sufficient conditions of game equilibriums. These results indicate that underwriter spread is a key in the game, and underwriters are apt to manipulate when the coefficient of the spread increases, and so the market＇ s net order loses its information efficiency. It may guarantee the market efficiency to control the underwriter spread.