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待售的美国对华反倾销税:基于“保护待售”模型的经验分析 被引量:6

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摘要 以格罗斯曼和赫尔普曼的"保护待售"模型为理论框架,本文将美国对华反倾销税率同反倾销案件申诉者的政治捐资、申诉者所属行业的进口渗透率联系起来,考察后者对前者的影响作用。经验分析表明:在美国对华反倾销案件中,申诉者的政治势力越强,反倾销税率越高;税率与进口渗透率的关系取决于申诉者的政治组织状况,若申诉者在政治上有组织,则税率与进口渗透率负相关,若申诉者在政治上无组织,则税率与进口渗透率正相关。这样,本文在验证了"保护待售"模型的核心结论的同时,还从利益集团的政治捐资层面上揭示出美国对华反倾销税背后隐藏的驱动力量。
出处 《经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第2期78-91,共14页 Economic Science
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