摘要
本文通过对在单一约束的商业银行利润函数中植入监管当局惩罚函数的静态理论模型的分析得出：监管当局以提高资本充足率为核心的监管行为不仅有效地影响了商业银行的信贷行为和风险意识，而且强化了“逆风向行事”的货币政策的非对称效应，接着本文对我国1998年以来经历的两次经济波动进行了实证分析，其结论是：1998年以来，监管当局对商业银行以降低坏账率、提高资本充足率为核心的监管行为强化了我国货币政策非对称效应。
This paper analyzes a static model of commercial banks with the reserve requirement constraint and punishing function imposed by the bank regulator, and finds that capital supervision focusing on improving banks＇ capital adequacy ratio strengthens the asymmetric effects of monetary policy by affecting banks＇ lending and risk taking behavior. The paper also studies the relationship between China＇s monetary policy and capital supervision since 1998 and finds that capital supervision has strengthened the asymmetric effects of monetary policy.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
2008年第1期481-508,共28页
China Economic Quarterly
