期刊文献+

资本结构和公司绩效互动影响实证研究——基于随机前沿方法的分析 被引量:10

Research on the Interactive Affection between Capital Structure and Firm Performance——Analysis Based on the Stochastic Frontier Approach
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摘要 根据代理理论的三个假说,公司资本结构和绩效间存在相互的非单调影响。利用随机前沿方法估计公司绩效并建立联立方程模型对我国市场进行实证检验,结果发现代理成本假说和效率风险假说能有效解释我国上市公司资本结构与绩效之间的互动关系,而特许经营价值假说则不能,即公司绩效随负债的增加而增加,但增加的速度是递减的;负债亦随公司绩效的增加而增加,且增加的速度是递增的。该模型还验证了影响资本结构和公司绩效的其他控制变量的有效性和显著性。 According to the three hypothesis of agency theory, there is a no monotonic effect between the capital structure and finn performance, Using stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to estimate finn efficiency, and establishing a simultaneous - equation model to test China' s stock market, the empirical result shows that the agency cost hypothesis and efficiency- risk hypothesis can well explain the interactive relationship between capital structure and firm performance, but franchise- value hypothesis can't. That is finn performance increases with the increasing of debt, but the rate of increasing decreases; and debt also increases with the increasing of finn performance, and the rate of inereashag increases. This model also tests the effectiveness and significant of some other control variables which affect the capital structure and firm performance.
出处 《山西财经大学学报》 CSSCI 2008年第4期77-83,共7页 Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金 国家杰出青年科学基金项目"证券市场波动性 流动性与价格行为研究"的研究成果 项目编号:70225002
关键词 随机前沿方法 代理理论 资本结构 公司绩效 互动影响 SFA agency theory capital structure firm performance interaction
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参考文献18

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二级参考文献93

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