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企业经营目标的历史演化:理论与实证 被引量:1

Historical Evolution of Firm's Operational Objectives: Theory and Practice
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摘要 企业的经营目标是一个长期争论的话题,历史上先后出现过利润最大化、价值(股东财富)最大化、相关利益者价值最大化、销售收入最大化和规模最大化等多个不同的观点。本文通过大样本问卷调查发现:(1)现阶段我国企业最重要的经营目标仍然是利润最大化,而很少考虑企业员工等相关利益者的利益;(2)多数企业同时设定几个逻辑上明显冲突的经营目标,表明现实企业经营目标的选择受多种因素的影响;(3)Logit回归模型显示,企业类型、规模、经营风格以及经理人员的任期、年龄和是否持股等状况与企业的经营目标有着密切联系。 Firm's operational objective has been a long-debated topic, which triggers various theories, such as Profit Maximization, Firm's Value (shareholder's wealth) Maximization, Stockholder's Value Maximization, Sales Maximization and Firm's Size Maximization. After analyzing questionnaire data, this paper finds out the following results: 1) Chinese finns nowadays still regard Profit Maximization as the most important operational objective, and care little about interests of stockholders such as finn staffs; 2) although most finns set several operational objectives at the same time, these objectives are logically self-conflicting, which indicates that firms' choices on operational objectives in reality are influenced by multiple factors; 3) Logit regression illustrates that finn's types, sizes, operational styles, manager's office tenure, age, and shareholding are closely associated with firm's choices on operational objectives.
作者 何青
机构地区 南开大学
出处 《南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版)》 2008年第1期26-33,共8页 Journal of Nanchang Hangkong University(Social Sciences)
基金 教育部社科青年项目(07JC790063)的阶段性成果
关键词 企业理论 经营目标 LOGIT回归 问卷调查 Finn theory Operational objective Logistic regression Questionnaire inquiry
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