组织内控制权分配:机制设计的视角

The Allocation of Authority in Organization:Organizzational Design Mechanism Perspective

组织内控制权分配是一项契约安排,合理的控制权分配可以节约组织内的交易成本。一个可以观察到的趋势是,经济学家越来越关注于组织内控制权或者权威的研究,试图通过对组织内控制权或权威的探讨来研究提高组织绩效的方向。企业组织里的权威或者控制权是可以转让的,控制权分配发生于组织内的委托人和代理人之间,具体而言是发生在组织内的领导和下属之间。一个不断困扰经济学家及其他学者的重要问题是:组织内的控制权是如何分配的?沿着这样一个总体思路,本文从以下几个角度深入分析和评述了组织内的控制权分配理论的进展:(1)显示原理;(2)通讯成本与契约复杂性;(3)信息处理;(4)串谋;(5)再谈判与不完全契约。这些理论总结将有助于深入研究组织设计以及决策效率等现代企业理论中的关键问题。

The allocation of authority is a contract arrangement, which may reduce the transaction cost in the firm. The contemporary economists begin to pay more attention to the research of authority in the organization and try to find the way to enhance the performance of organization through the research. The author- ity depends on the ownership for its existence, which means the stockholder（s） of the company owns the authority and could determine the allocation of authority. The current situation for the firm is the separation of ownership and authority, and the managers have the authority. The authority in a firm is transferable and could be allocated between the leader and the subordinate. An important question bothering economists is： What kinds of factors determine the organizations＇ forms？ Or under what conditions the company will choose centralization or decentralization？ The second issue is how to allocate the authority to motivate the agent release private information？ What factors will influence the delegation？ How does the allocation affect the information release in an organization？ The third issue is based on the previous two and recognizes that there exists opportunism in the organization and opportunism by the agent will cause the transaction cost. Could the principal utilize the contract tool and sign different contract with different agents to increase the efficiency of the authority？ Then, how to overcome the opportunism by designing different contract mechanism？ Following the above-mentioned research design and raised prob- lems, this article reviews and analyses the development of the theory of allocation of authority from the following perspectives： （1） Revelation Principle; （2） Communication Cost and Contract Com- plexity ;（3） Information processing; （4） Collusion; （5） Incomplete Commitment, Renegotiation and Incomplete Contract. These theo- ries related mechanism design will promote the further research on some key issues of modern enterprise theory, such as Organization Design and Decision Efficiency.