不对称信息下闭环供应链的合作机制分析

Cooperation mechanism analysis for closed-loop supply chain under asymmetric information

利用博弈论中的委托代理理论和显示原理,在回收固定投资的规模参数信息不对称下,研究了闭环供应链的合作机制,并与对称信息下的合作机制进行了比较,最后通过算例进行了分析。研究结果表明,在对称信息和不对称信息下,制造商都可以通过向零售商收取与制造成本相同的批发价和一定的特许经营费达到合作目的,但在对称信息下制造商索取全部合作后的超额利润,零售商只获得分散化决策下的利润,在不对称信息下,有信息优势的零售商可获得更多的利润。

Cooperation mechanism under asymmetric information of the retailer＇s investment scaling parameter was studied and compared to the cooperation mechanism under the symmetric information based on principal-Agent theory and revelation principle. Finally, illustration was given by a case study. Main results revealed that the cooperation mechanism under the symmetric and asymmetric information could be designed by the manufacturers who received average unit cost manufacturing as the wholesale price and a certain franchisee fee; the manufacturer achieved all the excess profit and the retailer only achieved profit of the decentralized structure under the symmetric information; and that the retailer with information advantage could obtain more profit under the asymmetric information.