可分离物品拍卖及污染物排放总量分配方法

Divisible goods auction model and a method for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity

以污染物允许排放总量的分配为背景,针对治污边际成本为私有信息的情况,研究了一个资源分配的拍卖方法和模型.具体地,首先分析了无偿分配的局限性和局中人可能的策略行为,也讨论了一种确定总量的有偿分配方法可能的均衡结果和存在的问题.然后,基于可分离物品拍卖思想给出了一种可变总量的竞争分配模型,研究了其有限激励性和分配有效性,同时也得到了一个统一价格拍卖的均衡结论,该结论与现有的一些成果相比更具一般性.最后结合湖北省环境规划有效性的评价讨论了该模型的应用.

This paper researches a method of allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity in which an enterprise＇s marginal cost of pollution treatment is regarded as its private information. First, the free allocation＇s limtations and player＇ s strategic behaviors are analyzed. And an equilibrium point of paying allocation is also deeply discussed with an invariable total permitted pollution discharge capacity. Then, a competition allocation model is given with the variable total permitted pollution discharge capacity based on divisible goods auction iden, whose stimulant and validity are analyzed and compared with the above two methods, simuttaneoysly, an equilibrium result is also obtained about auction under an uniform price. Lastly, the allocation model is applied to the environmental plan in Hubei province, China.