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道德风险——我国再保险供给不足成因的新视角 被引量:4

Moral Hazard:Insufficiency of Reinsurance Supply in China
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摘要 保险领域的道德风险,不仅发生在直接保险交易中,而且也发生在再保险交易中。道德风险的产生,减少了再保险供给的数量,降低了再保险合同双方的效用水平。文章从量化我国财产保险再保险供给不足入手,指出我国再保险供给不足这一现状,通过介绍道德风险存在引起再保险供给不足的模型,提出对我国再保险交易道德风险防范的控制措施。 In the field of insurance,moral hazards occur not only in direct insurance transactions,but also in reinsurance transactions.The moral hazards cause the decrease of the reinsurance supply and reduce the utilities of insurer and reinsurer.From the measured Chinese non-life reinsurance supply,the insufficiency of Chinese reinsurance supply is pointed out.By introducing the modal of how moral hazards reduce the reinsurance supply,some precautions and control measures in reinsurance are put forward.
作者 高舜嘉
机构地区 厦门大学金融系
出处 《改革与战略》 北大核心 2008年第4期63-66,共4页 Reformation & Strategy
关键词 再保险供给 道德风险 reinsurance supply moral hazard
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参考文献4

  • 1张琳.再保险市场供给不足的原因分析[J].保险研究,2003(10):43-45. 被引量:8
  • 2Doherty N A, Smetters K.An empirical investigation of moral hazard in reinsurance relationships.Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Market[R].Working paper, Department of Insurance and Risk Mangemerit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,2000.
  • 3Shavell St. On Moral Hazard and Insurance[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1979,(93):541-562.
  • 4Klaus Bender.The Moral Hazard-Reducing Function of Service in Reinsurance Relationships[R].Working paper. Department of Finance Goethe-University, Frankfurt, Germany, March 2001.

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