出口退税是一项稳健的贸易政策吗？

Can Export Tax Rebate be a Robust Policy Recommendation towards An International Multi-market Oligopoly?

出口退税作为一项被WTO允许的政策工具,为许多国家的政府所使用。本文在一个国际多市场寡头模型之中,研究出口退税的稳健性。主要结论如下:(1)如果本国政府的目标是最大化国家福利,那么,出口退税不是一项稳健的贸易政策;(2)如果本国政府关心收入分配,对于国家福利的不同组成部分赋予不同的权重,那么,如果政府过于关注本国企业利润,而不是本国消费者剩余和出口退税成本,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策;(3)本国政府过于关注本国企业利润的一个可能原因是,本国企业可以通过政治捐献去游说政府,制定对于自己有利的政策。那么,如果相对于国家福利而言,政府过于关注政治捐献,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策。

Export tax rebate is used by a number of national governments since it is a legitimate policy instrument under the rules of the WTO. In this paper, we study whether it is a robust trade policy towards an international multi-market oligopoly. We show that its effect is equivalent to that of an export subsidy ; and it is very sensitive to the mode of product market competition. However, if we consider the case where domestic firms lobby the government for setting their favorable policies by giving the government political contributions （modeled in a common agency framework）, then export tax rebate as a robust trade policy can emerge in an equilibrium outcome when the government cares about political contributions sufficiently relative to national welfare.