三层供应链协同预测博弈研究

Study on Three-echelon SC collaborative Forecasting Game Based on Arbitrary Investment Level

运用纳什均衡和贝叶斯更新模型,得到了在一个三层供应链中联合预测的实现条件。模型中,供应商、运输商、零售商均需决定在预测技术上的投资水平,三方的需求预测将会被汇总成一个统一的预测。结果表明,各方预测能力越接近中等水平,会有更多成员倾向于在预测上进行投资。预测能力偏离中等水平越远,越容易出现搭便车行为,即至少有一方不进行预测。

The paper uses Nash equilibrium and Bayesian updating model to obtain conditions that fit for collaborative forecasting in a 3-echelon SC. In the model, the supplier, transporter and retailer should decide how much to invest in forecasting technology. Their forecasts will be combined to form a single forecast. The result shows that if the forecasting capability of each side more approaches to the intermediate level, there are more partners to invest in forecast and otherwise, the free-tiding is more likely to happen, namely there is one part at least refusing to invest.