杰克逊的“知识论证”错在何处? 被引量：5

What's Wrong with F.Jackson's Knowledge Argument?

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摘要 This is a critical examination of Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument against the physicalist conception of mind.There are various physicalist positions concerning the nature of mind.What is defended against Jackson’s attack in this paper is a reductive version of physicalism,reductive in the ontological sense,according to which qualia are microphysical states of the brain.The basic idea is the following:that such states are perceived as phenomena is no proof that they are non-physical.A positive account of what phenomenal states are and how they fit into the physical world is provided.The way in which they are perceived phenomenally and referred to by phenomenal concepts,has a selective advantage for those who have them. This is a critical examination of Frank Jackson's famous knowledge argument against the physicalist conception of mind.There are various physicalist positions concerning the nature of mind.What is defended against Jackson's attack in this paper is a reductive version of physicalism,reductive in the ontological sense,according to which qualia are microphysical states of the brain.The basic idea is the following:that such states are perceived as phenomena is no proof that they are non-physical.A positive account of what phenomenal states are and how they fit into the physical world is provided.The way in which they are perceived phenomenally and referred to by phenomenal concepts,has a selective advantage for those who have them.

作者程炼

机构地区北京大学哲学系

出处《哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第4期86-92,共7页 Philosophical Research

关键词知识论证杰克逊物理主义物理状态澳大利亚物理世界弗兰克哲学家

分类号 B019.1 [哲学宗教—哲学理论] G224 [文化科学]

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共引文献2

1冯周卓,卢德之.实践关系视野中的“他者”[J].求索,2007(8):159-161. 被引量：2
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1蒉益民.知识论证与物理主义[J].社会科学战线,2006(3):8-13. 被引量：8
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