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企业群体协同机制的形式化建模及存在性 被引量:18

Modeling and existence of enterprise synergy mechanisms
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摘要 针对企业群体合作机制研究缺乏形式化定义的问题,基于对供需链协调问题没有从对策论的角度出发,显式地考虑集体理性的局限性分析,提出企业群体(供需链)协同问题,并对它进行形式化定义及协同机制的存在性证明。该文将企业群体协同定义为企业群体在某种合作机制下,各成员企业在个体满意的前提下,达到整体效用最大化的状态。进而建立了企业群体长期交易的重复博弈模型,并基于无名氏定理证明了协同解的存在性。理论证明指出,只要企业足够关注长远目标,供需链(企业群体)总可以实现协同。 Cooperation between companies provides synergy, through improved supply chain coordination. This paper gives a formal definition of the enterprise synergy problem (ESP) and criteria for the existence of the ESP mechanism. The ESP is defined as the optimal status of the overall supply chain for a given set of mechanisms on the condition that each enterprise in the chain gains its satisfied utility. The proof of the existence of a given set of mechanisms shows that an arbitrary supply chain can achieve synergy as long as its members are sufficiently concerned about long-term targets.
出处 《清华大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2008年第4期486-489,共4页 Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)
基金 国家“十一五”科技支撑计划(2006BAH02A05)
关键词 供需链 协同 博弈论 重复博弈 supply chain synergy game theoryl repeated gaming
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参考文献6

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二级参考文献7

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