经理自主权、高管报酬差距与公司业绩

Empirical Study on Relationship among Managerial Discretion,Top Management Pay Gap and Firm Performance

以权力决定理论(Managerial power approach)为依据,引入经理自主权变量研究高管报酬差距的决定机制及其对公司业绩的影响效应。在理论分析的基础上,选择2004年沪、深A股上市公司数据为样本,采用曲线估计、多元回归进行实证分析。主要结论有:①经理自主权对高管报酬差距具有先促进后抑制的影响效应,呈现典型的倒U型关系。其中,促进效应的存在是因为低自主权经理的权威与利益需求占主导位置,且更强调提高报酬差距促进高管竞争;而抑制效应的出现则是因为高自主权经理更强调不公平感对高管人员的负向影响,倾向于降低高管报酬差距促进合作与满意。②较大的高管报酬差距能够促进高管层对经理的内部监督,约束经理不正当使用自主权,从而促进经理自主权对公司业绩的正效应。

Based on managerial power approach, managerial discretion is introduced into the study of top management pay gap＇ s decisive mechanism and its effect on firm performance. According to the theoretical analysis, the data of listed firms of Shenzhen and Shanghai stock market in 2004 is chosen and the methods of curve estimation and muti - vari- able regression are adopted to make empirical study. The main conclusions are ： ①There is an inversed - U relationship between managerial discretion and top management pay gap which means that managerial discretion improves top management pay gap at first, and then decreases it finally. The exist of positive effect is because CEOs with lower managerial discretion pay more attention to his own authority and benefits and emphasize competition among top managers, while the exist of negative effect is because CEOs with higher managerial discretion pay more attention to the negative results coming from the sense of unfairness.②Top management pay gap can improve the internal monitoring among top managers and constrain the misconduct of CEO, and thus the positive effect of managerial discretion on firm performance will be improved.